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COMMENT

Swarna and Baoanan: Unraveling the
Diplomatic Immunity Defense to Domestic
Worker Abuse
EMILY F. SIEDELL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Providing individuals with the opportunity to redress wrongs
committed against them is arguably one of the core purposes of a
justice system.1 However, this principle necessarily relies on the
assumption that the accused party can be brought to court.
Historically, plaintiffs bringing suits against diplomats have been
denied this opportunity to redress wrongs by virtue of the diplomatic
immunity defense. One highly visible area where this is particularly
true is in the context of human rights and, more specifically, domestic
worker abuse cases. These cases involve suits brought by domestic
workers against their diplomat employers seeking overdue
compensation or damages for mistreatment. However, diplomatic
privileges, as codified under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, provide diplomats with immunity from civil and criminal
liability and thus courts have consistently struck down domestic
workers‟ cases for lack of jurisdiction.2 Yet, two recent cases,
Swarna v. Al-Awadi and Baoanan v. Baja, indicate that the tide may
be turning. In dismissing the defendants‟ claims of residual
diplomatic immunity, the court in these two cases takes the first,
* Editor in Chief, Maryland Journal of International Law 2010–2011; J.D.,
University of Maryland School of Law, May 2011.
1. LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC
IMMUNITY 496 (1999).
2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31, Apr. 18, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf; see infra Part II.A.

173

SIEDELL Article

9/25/2011 2:06 PM

174

[VOL. 26:173

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

albeit conservative, step toward improved access to justice for
domestic workers.3
By parsing details and definitions, Swarna and Baoanan
hopefully represent the beginning of a trend in which courts strike
down diplomatic immunity as a defense to domestic worker claims.
However, in rejecting the diplomatic immunity defense, the court in
these two cases creates the unintended consequence that the
condemned behavior of former diplomats is condoned when
committed by active diplomats. Thus, while these cases may help
advance the rights of domestic workers, the unintended dichotomy
they create may also finally force the hand of signatory countries to
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to enact an
amendment or otherwise come to an agreement in which they limit
diplomatic immunity for both active and former diplomats. Such an
amendment would correct the perverse dichotomy and reflect the
judicial trend articulated in Swarna and Baoanan such that domestic
workers will have a stronger foundation on which to depend in
bringing their grievances.
This article will explore the development and application of
diplomatic immunity as defined by the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). It will then review prior case law
regarding claims brought by abused domestic workers against their
employers, whether active or former diplomats. Finally, the article
will explore the court‟s reasoning in Swarna and Baoanan and
analyze the way in which these two cases provide for more equitable
judicial outcomes, question the underlying purpose of diplomatic
immunity, and further highlight the need to limit diplomatic
immunity.

3. Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), reconsideration
denied, 2009 WL 1562811 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
and remanded, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010); Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). In Swarna v. Al-Awadi, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit vacated the default judgment entered for the plaintiff by the District Court
on the grounds that the defendants‟ default “was not willful but instead based on
mistaken belief.” 622 F.3d at 142–43. However, the Second Circuit upheld the
substantive merits of the District Court‟s findings, specifically that residual
immunity did not operate as a defense to Swarna‟s claims. Id. at 140.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Diplomatic Immunity Doctrine and
Application of the VCDR
Diplomatic immunity can be traced back as early as ancient
Greece when envoys were protected from harm by the receiving state
due to possible reprisal by the sending state and retaliation by the
gods.4 Necessity formed the basis of diplomatic immunity in that
immunity allowed for the interaction and development of “rules and
understanding underlying the practice of international politics.”5
From the time of antiquity forward, what had previously been
courtesies bestowed upon envoys evolved into rights and eventually
into precedent or tradition.6 Defining when and to what degree these
privileges applied to envoys sent from other nations was regarded as
an issue for legal determination.7
Many nations chose to approach the issue of diplomatic
immunity by codifying the privileges, as was the case with the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,8 which became one of
the most successful and widely supported conventions.9 The Vienna
Convention‟s preamble identifies that the purpose of the diplomatic
immunity privilege “is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as
representing States . . . .”10 The Convention provides for protection
for both the premises of the mission (which agents of the receiving
state may not enter without permission from the head of the mission)
4. FREY & FREY, supra note 1, at 5–6. “Receiving state” refers to the country
that is receiving a diplomatic envoy from another country whereas the “sending
state” is the country sending that envoy.
5. Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id.
8. Id.; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2, pmbl., 23
U.S.T. at 3230, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96.
9. J. CRAIG BARKER, THE PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL 62–63
(2006). The VCDR has received the endorsement of the International Court of
Justice which “expressed the view that the privileges and immunities of diplomatic
and consular personnel were part of general international law.” Jonathan Brown,
Diplomatic Immunity: State Practice Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, 37 INT‟L & COMP. L.Q. 53, 53–54 (1988) (citing United States
Diplomatic Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 31 (May 24)).
10. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2, pmbl., 23 U.S.T.
at 3230, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96.
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and for individual diplomatic agents for which the Convention
provides, “ . . . shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form
of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due
respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on
his person, freedom or dignity.”11 The Convention goes further to
note, in Article 31, that diplomatic agents are immune from criminal,
civil, and administrative jurisdiction with three narrow exceptions: a
real action involving private property, an action regarding succession
in which the diplomatic agent acts as a private person, and “an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official
functions.”12 The VCDR also establishes the scope of immunity, and
therefore liability, in other international agreements including the
Headquarters Agreement governing the relationship between the
United States and the United Nations.13
Diplomatic immunity has been asserted in a number of cases to
prevent liability from attaching to a diplomat‟s crime or otherwise
illegal behavior. Examples range from a diplomat being immune to
charges of speeding14 to preventing a court from having jurisdiction
to undertake child protective proceedings in the case of children
abused by their diplomat parents.15 Domestic worker cases are
particularly vulnerable to claims of diplomatic immunity.16 Often the
cases involve domestic workers hired and brought from their home
countries to work for diplomats assigned to a particular country based
on previously agreed upon terms and conditions of employment such
as salary and vacation time.17 Unfortunately, there are instances in

11. Id. arts. 22, 29, 23 U.S.T. at 3259, 3262, 500 U.N.T.S. at 101, 103.
12. Id. art. 31, 23 U.S.T. at 3240–41, 500 U.N.T.S. at 103.
13. Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
14. Burkhardt v. Page-Sharp, 91 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (New Rochelle City Ct.
1949).
15. In re Terrence K, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1988).
16. See, e.g., Emily Dugan, Diplomat’s Nanny Lifts Lid on Modern Slavery,
INDEP., Aug. 9, 2009; Sarah Fitzpatrick, Diplomatic Immunity Leaves Abused
Workers in the Shadows, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2009, at A4; Petra Follmar,
Daniela Hödl & Ulrike Mentz-Eickhoff, Female Domestic Workers in the Private
Households of Diplomats in the Federal Republic of Germany (Sept. 2003),
http://www.ban-ying.de/downloads/cedaw%20engl.pdf.
17. E.g., Paredes v. Vila, 479 F. Supp. 2d 187, 189–90 (D.D.C. 2007); Ahmed,
2002 WL 1964806, at *1; Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Va. 1995),
aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1996).
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which the employers not only fail to live up to their promises, but
also engage in behavior that extends into abuse.18
Like many other cases involving diplomats, cases brought by
abused domestic workers have often been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction on account of diplomatic immunity asserted by the
diplomat being charged, or otherwise have been unsuccessful for the
domestic worker plaintiffs.19 In some cases, the use of the diplomatic
immunity defense has been justified on policy grounds. 20 For
example, the court in Ahmed v. Hoque accepted diplomatic immunity
as a shield against liability in a case brought by a domestic worker
noting that: “[t]his result is compelled for the reason that „by
upsetting existing treaty relationships American diplomats abroad
may well be denied lawful protection of their lives and property to
which they would otherwise be entitled.‟”21 This argument stems
from the fact that diplomats are often stationed in areas where due
process is not recognized, where legal procedures are prejudiced
against diplomats, or where diplomats are frequently harassed.22
In addition to jurisdictional issues and policy concerns, some
cases have focused on whether the diplomats‟ actions fit within the
“commercial activity” exception of Article 31.23 This exception
18. E.g., Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 286 (discussing a domestic worker, originally
from the Philippines, who agreed to work in the United States for diplomats based
on her understanding that she would receive minimum wage, overtime, and a
reasonable work schedule. However, during her time working for the diplomats she
was required to work sixteen hours a day at $0.50 an hour with no overtime.
Moreover, her passport was confiscated, and she was threatened with deportation,
arrest, or dismissal if she attempted to leave the house); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607
F. Supp. 2d 509, 512–13 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), reconsideration denied, 2009 WL
1562811 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded,
622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing a domestic worker, originally from India,
who agreed to come to the United States to work in the home of diplomats based
upon an agreed salary of $2,000 per month with vacation time. The domestic
worker was only paid $200 to $300 per month, had her passport confiscated, was
forbidden to leave the apartment or use the telephone to make calls, was called
names, and was physically abused and raped).
19. E.g., Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 195; Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 292.
20. See, e.g., Ahmed, 2002 WL 1964806, at *5 (citing 767 Third Ave. Assoc. v.
Permanent Mission of Republic of Zaire to United Nations, 988 F.2d 295, 296 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
21. Id.
22. FREY & FREY, supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 192–93; Tabion, 877 F. Supp. at 288.
The commercial activity exception states that a diplomatic agent shall “enjoy
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reflects a general prohibition on diplomats engaging in trade or
having a second occupation while simultaneously serving as a
representative of the sending state.24 However, attempts to apply this
exception in the context of domestic worker abuse cases have been
largely unsuccessful.25 For example, in Paredes v. Vila, one of the
arguments advanced by the plaintiff, a domestic worker who brought
suit against her former employers for breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, was that the plaintiff‟s employment contract constituted
a commercial and/or professional activity outside the diplomat‟s
official functions.26 Citing both to a Fourth Circuit opinion in the case
of Tabion v. Mufti and to the Statement of Interest filed by the United
States, the court found that “a contract for domestic services such as
the one at issue in this case is not itself a „commercial activity‟ within
the meaning of Article 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.”27
Ahmed and Paredes are just two illustrations of the type of
reception diplomatic immunity-related cases receive in court.
However, as will be explained below, these types of cases receive
closer scrutiny and a more fact-intensive analysis when the diplomat
being charged with the offense is a former rather than an active
diplomat.28

immunity from . . . civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of . . .
[a]n action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.” Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2.
24. EILEEN DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 473 (3d ed. 2008).
25. See, e.g., Paredes, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 193 (citing Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 537 (4th Cir. 1996)). In
deciding to give weight to the Statement of Interest filed by the United States
government, the court noted that “the Supreme Court has held that „although not
conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.‟” Id.
(citing United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)); see also Sabbithi v. Al
Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that employing plaintiff as
a domestic worker did not constitute a commercial activity outside the official
functions of the defendants).
28. See Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that
Article 39 of the VCDR provides for a more restrictive form of immunity than that
afforded under Article 31).
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B. Former Diplomats: Residual Immunity
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides
different guidelines for assessing domestic worker claims against
former diplomats as compared to claims against current or active
diplomats.29 Article 39 of the VCDR provides that
When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and
immunities have come to an end, such privileges and
immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he
leaves the country . . . . However, with respect to acts
performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions
as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to
subsist.30
This continued, albeit diminished, immunity is justified, for as Eileen
Denza, a diplomatic law expert, explains,
The acts of a diplomatic agent in the exercise of his official
functions are in law the acts of the sending State. It has
therefore always been the case that the diplomat cannot at
any time be sued in respect of such acts since this would be
indirectly to implead the sending State.31
The determinative question for deciding whether a diplomat is
entitled to residual immunity is whether a particular act committed
against a plaintiff was performed by the diplomat in the exercise of
his official functions.32 Some cases reflect a broad, policy-based
approach to this question. For example, in Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, in
which a domestic worker brought claims against her former
employers, Kuwaiti diplomats, the court simply concluded that
because the plaintiff‟s claims did not fit within the commercial
activity exception, the defendant‟s immunity remained intact under a
residual immunity analysis.33 However, other case law reflects a
more nuanced analysis of residual immunity. In assessing when
diplomatic immunity is applicable, courts have often adhered to the

29. Id.
30. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 2, art. 39, 23 U.S.T.
at 3245–46, 500 U.N.T.S. at 107–08.
31. DENZA, supra note 24, at 439.
32. Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d 509, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
reconsideration denied, 2009 WL 1562811 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, and remanded, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
33. 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009).
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principle that immunity applies to a former diplomat‟s official but not
private acts.34 As illustrated in De Luca v. United Nations Org., an
“official act” is one directly related to duties listed under Article 3 of
the VCDR.35 Specifically, the court in De Luca held that former UN
officials were entitled to residual diplomatic immunity against the
plaintiff‟s claims that they had instigated an unlawful tax audit,
forged pay statements, and had failed to investigate these claims.36
The court reasoned that the former UN officials‟ actions were based
on their official duties to implement financial and employmentrelated policies and thus were covered by residual immunity.37
Courts have also found “official act” to include a diplomat‟s
hiring of an employee to work at the diplomatic mission and, by
extension, any disputes that arise as a result of that employment.38 In
Brzak v. United Nations, UN employees brought claims including
emotional distress and indecent battery against the United Nations
and UN officials.39 As in the case of De Luca, the Brzak court was
concerned with whether a particular act fell within a diplomat‟s
official functions, noting that UN officers are granted immunity from
claims “relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity
and falling within their functions.”40 In determining whether a claim
“related to” acts performed in an officer‟s official capacity, the court
looked to whether the alleged acts were the result of the exercise of
official functions rather than being concerned with the nature of the
acts themselves.41 On this basis, the court held that because the acts
alleged by the plaintiffs occurred in the workplace, they were acts

34. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
35. Id. (citing De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841 F. Supp. 531, 534–35
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)). Article 3 duties under the VCDR include, inter alia, negotiating
with the government of the receiving state, reporting on developments in the
receiving state to the sending state, and promoting friendly relations between the
sending and receiving states. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra
note 2, art. 3, 23 U.S.T. at 3231–32, 500 U.N.T.S. at 98.
36. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 517 (citing De Luca, 841 F. Supp. at 534–35).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 518.
39. Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). While
the Brzak case involves the United Nations and its officials rather than diplomatic
agents, it is still concerned with the application of Article 39 of the VCDR. Id. at
317.
40. Id. at 319.
41. Id.
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against which the officers were immunized despite the fact that such
conduct was wrongful and inappropriate.42
Finally, case law demonstrates that official acts do not include
“acts that were completely peripheral to the official‟s diplomatic
duties.”43 In the case of In re Application of Noboa, the court faced
the issue of whether a former diplomatic agent was immune from
complying with a subpoena requiring her to produce documents and
give a deposition.44 The court held residual diplomatic immunity to
be inapplicable because at the time the defendant was served with the
subpoena she was on a trip not related to her diplomatic duties.45
While the facts and context of these cases differ, they
demonstrate a common theme that runs throughout residual
diplomatic immunity case law, namely that courts have a tendency to
uphold diplomatic immunity for defendants except in the most
egregious of situations.
C. Swarna and Baoanan: A Turning Point in Residual Immunity
Analysis
1. Swarna v. Al-Awadi
Swarna v. Al-Awadi was the first indication that courts might
begin reigning in the scope of diplomatic immunity. This section
explores the court‟s reasoning in this case and the way in which it
came to the conclusion that diplomatic immunity was an insufficient
defense to a domestic worker‟s claims of abuse.
In 1995, Vishranthamma Swarna agreed to relocate to the United
States to work as a domestic worker for Mr. Al-Awadi, who was
serving as Third Secretary at the Kuwait Mission in New York City,
and his wife, Ms. Al-Shaitan.46 Swarna was promised $2,000 per
month, Sundays off, and one month of paid vacation per year to visit

42. Id. at 320; see also D‟Cruz v. Annan, No. 05 Civ. 8918(DC), 2005 WL
3527153, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2005) (holding that plaintiff‟s claims including
harassment and suspension arose from his employment at the United Nations and
relate only to acts performed within the official capacity of the defendants as UN
officials and employees, and thus the defendants were immune from liability).
43. Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
44. Id. at 518 (citing In re Application of Noboa, M18-302, M19-111(JSM),
1995 WL 581713, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1995)).
45. Id. (citing In re Application of Noboa, 1995 WL 581713, at *4).
46. Id. at 512–13.
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her family in India.47 However, when Swarna arrived in the United
States, Mr. Al-Awadi confiscated her passport, forced her to work
approximately seventeen hours a day, seven days a week, and paid
her only $200-$300 per month.48 Moreover, Swarna was forbidden to
leave the apartment unless she was supervised (even with
supervision, Swarna only left the apartment a total of ten to fifteen
times in four years), was forbidden to use the telephone to make calls,
and was called derogatory names.49 Swarna was also repeatedly raped
by Mr. Al-Awadi and physically abused by Mr. Al-Awadi and his
wife on numerous occasions.50
Swarna initially filed the lawsuit while Mr. Al-Awadi was still
serving as a Kuwaiti diplomat.51 Like many of the domestic worker
cases previously cited, the district court dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction, citing the fact that Mr. Al-Awadi was entitled to
diplomatic immunity.52 However, the court dismissed the case
without prejudice because the court noted that Swarna could re-file
her action against Mr. Al-Awadi when he was no longer serving as a
Kuwaiti diplomat.53 Swarna accepted the court‟s implicit suggestion
and once again filed a claim against Mr. Al-Awadi when he had
completed his diplomatic service.54 The court then assessed Swarna‟s
labor law and Alien Tort Claims Act claims under the residual
immunity language of Article 39 of the VCDR.55
i. Labor Law Claims
Swarna alleged labor law claims in the form of failure to pay
required wages, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract.56
Applying the principles set forth in prior cases and parsing the
language of Article 39, the court noted that the protection afforded by
residual immunity was inapplicable if the acts alleged by Swarna
could be considered private acts, separate from Mr. Al-Awadi‟s
47. Id.
48. Id. at 513.
49. Id. at 513–14.
50. Id. at 514.
51. Id. (citing Vishranthamma v. Al-Awadi, No. 02 Civ. 3710(PKL)(MHD)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2005)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 514, 516.
55. Id. at 512, 516.
56. Id. at 512.
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official duties.57 The court agreed with the defendants that Swarna‟s
labor law claims could be described as “employment-related” as they
were based on an employment relationship, similar to the claims in
Brzak.58 However, the court hedged its agreement by noting, “[i]t
does not follow that all employment-related acts by a diplomat are
official acts to which residual immunity attaches once the diplomat‟s
duties end.”59 In this particular case, the court held that residual
immunity was unavailable as a defense because Mr. Al-Awadi‟s
employment of Swarna was a private rather than an official act. 60 In
so holding, the court reasoned that Swarna‟s employment “bore no
relationship to the „functions of a diplomatic mission‟” as listed under
Article 3 of the VCDR, that Swarna was not employed as part of
implementing an official policy of the Kuwait Mission, and that
Swarna was not hired to work at the Kuwait Mission as a subordinate
of Mr. Al-Awadi.61 The court went on to note that, even though on
occasion Swarna had served members of the Kuwait mission when
Mr. Al-Awadi and his wife entertained at home, “[t]his tangential
benefit to the Kuwait Mission did not make her an employee of the
mission, and did not make Mr. Al-Awadi‟s act of employing her „in
law the act[] of the sending State.‟”62
ii. Alien Tort Claims Act Claims (ATCA)
Under ATCA, Swarna brought claims of “trafficking,
involuntary servitude, forced labor, assault and sexual abuse.”63 In
response to these claims, the court noted that if residual immunity
were held to extend to rape and the other acts cited by Swarna it
would be “tantamount to holding that Art. 39 extends to all acts taken
by a diplomatic agent . . . .”64 Moreover, the court found that the acts
alleged by Swarna were peripheral to Mr. Al-Awadi‟s duties and
responsibilities as a diplomat in much the same way as the In re
Application of Noboa case.65 Finally, the court cited the fact that
“diplomatic agents were only intended to receive residual immunity

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 519.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citing DENZA, supra note 24, at 439).
Id. at 512.
Id. at 521.
Id.
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with respect to official acts, and that not all acts of a diplomatic agent
were understood to be official.”66 As with the labor law claims, the
court held Mr. Al-Awadi‟s actions to have been private, thus once
again making residual immunity inapplicable.67
2. Baoanan v. Baja
While Swarna v. Al-Awadi laid the groundwork for abused
domestic workers to have greater access to justice, Baoanan v. Baja
confirmed and furthered the precedent of striking down diplomatic
immunity as an absolute defense. This section highlights the key facts
of the Baoanan case and explores the relationship between Baoanan
and its predecessor, Swarna.
As plaintiff Marichu Baoanan relays the story, Mr. and Mrs.
Baja asked her to travel to the United States from the Philippines by
making false promises of finding her employment as a nurse upon her
arrival.68 However, when Baoanan arrived, Mr. Baja, who was
serving as the Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the
United Nations at the time, forced her to work as a domestic servant
in their house at the Philippine Mission.69 During her time working
for Mr. Baja, Baoanan worked approximately 126 hours per week,
was forced to sleep in the basement, was prevented from leaving the
household unaccompanied or from using the telephone, and was
verbally abused.70
Like Swarna, the court here determined that Mr. Baja‟s claim of
diplomatic immunity was to be assessed under Article 39 of the
VCDR regarding residual immunity as opposed to the broader Article
31.71 In assessing Baoanan‟s claims, the court first rejected Mr. and
Mrs. Baja‟s blanket argument that they were entitled to diplomatic
immunity because the act of hiring and bringing domestic help into
the country was a “long engrained practice.”72 Rather, like Swarna,
the court here focused on determining whether Baoanan‟s
employment could be considered an official or private act.73

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 522.
Id.
Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 165.
Id.
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The court first looked to the documents used to obtain Baoanan‟s
visa to enter and work in the United States.74 Specifically, the court
took note of an affidavit which indicated that should a diplomat
employ private staff, it would be for personal household needs.75
From this stipulation the court concluded that “the employment of a
domestic worker by a diplomatic agent predominately for the purpose
of meeting his own and his family‟s personal needs is not an act
performed „in the exercise of his functions as a member of the
mission.‟”76 Again, as in Swarna, the court emphasized that
Baoanan‟s work at official Philippine Mission events did not
“transform her employment into an official act.”77 The court also
struck down the Bajas‟ assertion that because the family actually
resided in the Philippine Mission and Baoanan was hired to work in
the Bajas‟ residence that her employment was for official purposes
and that any disputes arising from the employment would likewise be
considered official and subject to diplomatic immunity, as was the
case in Brzak.78 In rejecting this argument, the court noted that “to
hold categorically that it is always an official act to employ an
individual who works within the four walls of a diplomatic
mission . . . would improperly reward form over substance.”79 The
court went on to note that “[p]hysical location should be considered
in determining whether an act is official or private, but certainly it is
not by itself dispositive.”80 The court reasoned that to hold otherwise
would:
[R]esult in a perverse outcome: a diplomatic agent whose
official residence happens to be located within the same
building as the mission would be immune from jurisdiction
for acts stemming from his employment of a domestic
worker, while a diplomatic agent who resides in a separate
building adjoining or nearby his mission and employs a
domestic worker to perform identical duties in an identical
fashion, would not qualify for immunity.81

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 167–68.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Id. at 168–69.
Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.
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The court found that Mr. Baja could not benefit from residual
immunity and ordered that the Bajas‟ motion to dismiss be denied.82
III. ANALYSIS
A. A Shift in Judicial Thinking: Departing From Prior
Precedent With an Eye on Equity
Prior case law reflects a broad definition and application of
diplomatic immunity. Cases such as De Luca and Brzak illustrate
courts‟ tendencies to side with diplomat defendants even in cases
involving residual diplomatic immunity. In contrast, Swarna and
Baoanan represent a shift in judicial thinking that focuses more on
achieving a fair and equitable result rather than accepting the
diplomatic immunity defense as a foregone conclusion. The two
cases represent an approach where the court appears more willing to
undertake a critical look at the VCDR language and prior precedent.
As such, the court provided the plaintiffs with a rare, invaluable
chance to present the merits of their claims against their diplomatic
employers to the court.
One of the first ways in which we see the court in Swarna and
Baoanan departing from precedent is in answering the pivotal
question of whether Swarna and Baoanan‟s employment could be
termed a private or official act. In answering, the court avoided
relying on prior precedent holding that employment-related conflicts
are within the scope of official acts or that location of employment,
such as inside the mission, invokes a diplomat‟s official functions
and thus protects him from liability.83 The court further avoided an
opportunity to ground the holding in prior case law by refusing to
conclude that even if Baoanan and Swarna‟s employment as domestic
workers was private, their involvement in official diplomatic events,
such as entertaining guests of the mission, transformed their
employment into an official act for which the diplomats could be held
immune from liability.84

82. Id. at 170–71.
83. See id. at 168–69; cf. Brzak v. United Nations, 551 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that “courts have consistently held that employmentrelated issues lie at the core of an international organization‟s immunity”).
84. Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 168; Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F. Supp. 2d
509, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), reconsideration denied, 2009 WL 1562811 (S.D.N.Y.
May 29, 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 622 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
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A second way we see the court departing from precedent and
more closely focusing on equitable ramifications is in its failure to
mention or even consider the policy ramifications of its decisions.
While in prior cases courts have struck down suits against diplomats
by highlighting the importance of diplomatic immunity in providing
safety and security for citizens sent abroad as diplomats, the court in
Swarna and Baoanan focused more closely on assessing the
individual facts of the cases at hand rather than assessing whether its
decisions further diplomacy and international relationships.85
B. Swarna and Baoanan Highlight the Tension Between the
VCDR and the Purpose of the Justice System and Question
the Underlying Rationale of Diplomatic Immunity
In choosing an equitable approach over adherence to prior case
law, the court in Swarna and Baoanan confronted competing
principles which ultimately forced the court to choose between
judicial ideals and international political realities. Moreover, the
results of Swarna and Baoanan currently support a perverse reading
of case law where diplomats are immune from claims of domestic
worker abuse when they are employed as active diplomats but may
be held accountable for those same claims when they are classified as
former diplomats. While this reading is supported by the VCDR,
specifically the limited language regarding immunity for former
diplomats (Article 39) compared to active diplomats (Article 31),
there arguably does not appear to be any logical connection between
diplomatic immunity and a diplomat‟s ability to effectively carry out
his or her duties.86
One of the first dilemmas which the court in Swarna and
Baoanan faced was how to achieve an equitable outcome while
adhering to the VCDR framework. The Swarna court solved this
conflict by framing its decision to allow the plaintiff to take

2010) (citing Brzak, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 319; De Luca v. United Nations Org., 841
F. Supp. 531, 534–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
85. Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 165–70; Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 520;
accord Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 292–93 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d
535 (4th Cir. 1996); Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002).
86. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Diplomatic and Consular Immunities and Human
Rights, 40 INT‟L & COMP. L.Q. 34, 47 (1991); see also René Värk, Personal
Inviolability and Diplomatic Immunity in Respect of Serious Crimes, 8 JURIDICA
INT‟L 110, 114 (2003).
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advantage of the system.87 Specifically, the court dismissed the
plaintiff‟s original complaint against Mr. Al-Awadi, who at the time
was actively serving as a diplomat, without prejudice because the
plaintiff could simply wait until Mr. Al-Awadi and his wife were no
longer actively employed as diplomats to re-file the claim.88 In doing
so, the Swarna court implicitly suggested that by waiting until Mr.
Al-Awadi had left his diplomatic post, the plaintiff would have a
better chance of succeeding on her claim because of the diminished
scope of residual immunity.89 However, in so implying, the court
upheld the very concept it later criticized in Baoanan, namely,
rewarding form (differences between immunity under Article 31 as
compared to Article 39) over substance.90 While Swarna and
Baoanan provided access to justice for domestic workers for whom
access had previously been nonexistent, the cases arguably
undermine the legitimacy and purpose of the justice system by only
allowing domestic workers to present their claims to the court when
particular circumstances are met rather than when a violation occurs.
A second tension the Swarna and Baoanan court confronted was
choosing between undermining the VCDR, which could put their
country‟s own diplomats at risk, or undermining the judicial
principles of equity and the right to redress wrongs. When faced with
the choice, courts have largely chosen to liberally interpret and
adhere to the VCDR in order to protect American diplomats while
knowingly turning a blind eye to abuses committed by diplomats.91
Fear for one‟s own diplomats stems from the concept of reciprocity
and the idea that a country‟s “representatives abroad are in some

87. See Swarna, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 514.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See Baoanan, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
91. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Hoque, No. 01 Civ. 7224(DLC), 2002 WL 1964806, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2002); see also FREY & FREY, supra note 1; see, e.g.,
Tabion v. Mufti, 877 F. Supp. 285, 292–93 (E.D. Va. 1995), aff’d, 73 F.3d 535 (4th
Cir. 1996) (noting that diplomatic immunity is valuable and necessary “[t]o protect
United States diplomats from criminal and civil prosecution in foreign lands with
differing cultural and legal norms as well as fluctuating political climates . . . .”);
Värk, supra note 86, at 111 (noting that “regardless of the severity of offences,
states have so far refrained from serious retaliatory actions due to several factors.
Firstly, states maintain a substantial number of diplomatic agents abroad and they
do not want to endanger the situation of their diplomats in different and not always
particularly safe countries”).
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sense always hostages.”92 It is this fear that “guarantees efficient
application of diplomatic law and also general obedience” but at the
same time prevents states from prosecuting diplomats even for acts
that are arguably not connected to a diplomat‟s efficient performance
of their job.93 Unlike prior cases, the court in Swarna and Baoanan
was willing to put the fear aside in favor of allowing for a more
equitable outcome. While prior case law would lead one to believe
that the Swarna and Baoanan decisions endanger American
diplomats abroad, arguably the court‟s approach creates a stronger
incentive for American diplomats to more closely adhere to Cordell
Hull‟s supposition that, “the privilege of diplomatic immunity does
not presuppose the right to violate any laws or regulations . . . of the
countries to which they are accredited; that on the contrary, the
privilege of such immunity imposes upon them [diplomats] the
obligation of observing meticulously such laws and regulations.”94
While the Swarna and Baoanan opinions highlight the
importance of achieving equitable outcomes, the decisions also
provide support for the contention that there is no functional
connection between immunity from civil and criminal liability and a
diplomatic agent‟s ability to effectively carry out his or her duties.95
This is especially true when immunity is provided for human rights
violations, as in the case of domestic worker abuse.96 For as
Francisco Orrego Vicuna advocates, “[b]y no standard can such acts
[human rights violations committed by diplomats] be considered as a
part of the diplomatic or consular function, and thus neither can be
considered an official act.”97 Vicuna goes on to argue that “[i]f one
aspect has been perfectly established in the contemporary law of
human rights, it is that no State can stand above the requirements of
protection of such fundamental rights.”98 While prior case law has
not necessarily embraced this view, Swarna and Baoanan are the first
indications that courts may be stepping up to accept their role in what
92. DENZA, supra note 24, at 2.
93. Värk, supra note 86, at 111.
94. FREY & FREY, supra note 1, at 497.
95. Vicuna, supra note 86.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Värk, supra note 86, at 114 (noting in the context of grave
crimes, “the theory of functional necessity or, in other words, the very same link
between diplomatic immunity and necessity to perform diplomatic functions
effectively renders questionable the necessity or legitimacy of diplomatic immunity
in such cases”).
98. Vicuna, supra note 86, at 47–48.
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Vicuna considers a new, emerging form of jurisdiction, namely the
“humanitarian jurisdiction.”99
C.

The Need For Change in the Realm of Diplomatic Immunity

The Swarna and Baoanan opinions provide support for
amending the scope and nature of diplomatic immunity under the
Vienna Convention. One logical possibility that would allow
domestic workers to seek compensation for harms perpetrated against
them by diplomats would be to enact domestic laws that would
impose conditions on countries wishing to send diplomats to that
country.100 As the ACLU advocated in their testimony to Congress
regarding the reauthorization of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act, Congress should require states, “as a condition for their
diplomats to obtain special visas for their domestic workers, to waive
their diplomats‟ immunity for civil claims arising from a breach of
the employment contract.”101 However, it is necessary to remember
in this context that any diplomatic protection that is denied diplomats
of one nation is likely to be reciprocated in that “failure to accord
privileges or immunities to diplomatic missions or to their members
is immediately apparent and is likely to be met by appropriate
countermeasures.”102 Thus, adopting ACLU‟s position would require
countries to make the same difficult choice faced by the court in
Swarna and Baoanan, namely choosing between allowing victims of
crimes committed by diplomats to bring claims against the diplomats
and protecting diplomats from being held responsible for the foreign
laws of the country in which they are stationed.
Other suggestions for change include requiring diplomatic
missions to carry insurance103 and establishing a fund which can be
used to compensate individuals who suffer abuse at the hands of

99. Id. at 45.
100. Eradicating Slavery: Preventing the Abuse, Exploitation and Trafficking of
Domestic Workers by Foreign Diplomats and Ensuring Diplomat Accountability:
Hearing on International Trafficking in Persons: Taking Action to Eliminate
Modern Day Slavery Before H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2007)
(statement of Caroline Frederickson, Director, Washington Legislative Office,
American Civil Liberties Union).
101. Id.
102. DENZA, supra note 24, at 2.
103. Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38
STAN. L. REV. 1517, 1517–18 (1986).
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diplomats.104 The insurance solution would operate by requiring
countries sending diplomats abroad to purchase insurance for their
diplomats from a group of private insurers.105 This solution would
provide a fallback option where abuse victims would be able to
pursue a claim against the insurer if the claim against the diplomat
was unsuccessful.106 While both the fund and insurance option would
allow for more equitable outcomes and thus prevent abuse victims
from being left empty-handed, neither option has been successfully
implemented.107 This is arguably a result of cost and reciprocity
concerns in that if a country, such as the United States, required
insurance of other nations sending their diplomats to the United
States, it would likely be required of the United States when it sends
diplomats abroad.108
Another possibility is for countries party to the Vienna
Convention to construct a list of agreed upon crimes for which
diplomatic immunity is waived and the diplomat may be
prosecuted.109 In his article, René Värk advocates this solution and
suggests using the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
as a starting place for constructing a list of universally recognized
crimes for which signatory countries to the Vienna Convention could
agree diplomatic immunity would not apply.110
While it is unclear which of the many proposed solutions would
be the most successful in providing abused domestic workers access
to justice, it is clear that action of some sort needs to be taken as
reports of abused domestic workers do not appear to be
diminishing.111
IV. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Swarna and Baoanan are early indications of
success in prosecuting diplomats who abuse their domestic workers.
While their holdings are arguably narrow, Swarna and Baoanan

104. Michael B. McDonough, Privileged Outlaws: Diplomats, Crime and
Immunity, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT‟L L. REV. 475, 491 (1997).
105. Id. at 492.
106. Id. at 492–93.
107. Id. at 493; Farhangi, supra note 103, at 1517.
108. McDonough, supra note 104, at 493.
109. Värk, supra note 86, at 114.
110. Id.
111. See sources cited supra note 16.
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represent a shift from prior decisions adhering strictly to the language
of and the policy purposes behind the Vienna Convention to a
judicial framework with a more equitable focus. However, the
decisions also create a contradictory result in which diplomats are
shielded from immunity for cases of domestic worker abuse when
acting as active diplomats but can be held accountable for the same
behavior when the diplomats are only protected under residual
immunity. There are no coherent justifications for this disparity or
plausible arguments to support the assertion that being shielded from
such liability allows a diplomat to more efficiently carry out his or
her functions.
While the dichotomy created by the Swarna and Baoanan
decisions does at least provide for a real possibility that an abused
domestic worker may recover from a diplomat, where prior precedent
largely did not provide for such an opportunity, plaintiffs are still
denied forthright access to justice. This is due to the fact that an
abused domestic worker, in order to have any chance for recovery in
court, must wait until the diplomat is no longer working in his or her
diplomatic capacity. Thus, while Swarna and Baoanan represent a
crucial first step, they are just the beginning of what will hopefully be
a legal overhaul of diplomatic law. In the meantime, Swarna and
Baoanan further support current criticisms of the broad diplomatic
protections afforded by the Vienna Convention. More specifically,
these cases present new justification for the need for an amendment
or other change that would hold diplomats accountable for their
abusive behavior. In this way, these two cases have the potential to
enact widespread change in the realm of international law.

